Pereira v. Sessions

Summary

This is a chapter in the 'what is a valid NTA' saga: the prequel to Niz-Chavez. In a stunning bit of horrifically-difficult-to-translate legalese, this case concerns 'the stop-time rule'. That rule is about a part of 42-B cancellation of removal: the requirement that the applicant respondent to have been continuously physically present in the United States for a period of ten years prior to the service of the NTA. That service 'stops (the) time (count)' -- physical presence subsequent to the service of the NTA cannot be counted towards those ten years.

So, Pereira v. Sessions says that it's about the stop-time rule, but that's just a red herring. The case is actually about what makes a valid NTA, because a valid NTA is what triggers the stop-time rule. To Be Continued in the next chapter, Niz-Chavez v. Garland.

Holding

A notice to appear that fails to specify the time or place of a noncitizen's removal proceedings, as required by INA § 239(a)(1) (8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)), does not trigger the stop-time rule under INA § 240A(d)(1) (8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)).

The statutory definition of a notice to appear requires, at a minimum for purposes of the stop-time rule, information identifying when and where the removal proceedings will be held. A document omitting that information does not satisfy the statutory requirement.

The statutory language governing notices to appear and the stop-time rule is unambiguous on this question. The government's administrative practice of issuing notices with hearing dates or locations to be determined does not override the requirements established by Congress.

Cited authorities

Matter of Camarillo, 25 I&N Dec. 644 (BIA 2011)

Cited by

Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155 (2021)

Notes

At time of writing, the Supreme Court's .pdf posting of this authority 404s out: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/17-459_1o13.pdf. An alternate link is provided, but it of course may become defunct.